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 Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits 
sex discrimination in employment,1 is generally seen as a meas-
ure intended to “remedy the economic deprivation of women” by 
placing them “on an equal footing with men” in the workplace.2  
While the overwhelming majority of sexual harassment com-
plaints filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion, the federal agency that enforces Title VII, are brought by 
women,3 men are also victims of sex discrimination in the work-
place—especially those who do not present themselves in the 
way their coworkers or employers believe a man should.  For 
example, men who wear lipstick and skirts refuse to conform to 
social demands about the way men “ought” to look. Quietness 
and passivity defy the stereotype that men are generally assertive 
and aggressive.  Men who have 
sexual relationships with other men 
challenge the heterosexist view that 
only male-female sexual relation-
ships are “natural.”  However, fed-
eral courts have been reluctant to 
extend the protections afforded  
women under Title VII to non-
gender-conforming men.   An 
overly narrow conception of sex 
discrimination blinds courts to the 
fact that these men are also victims 
of sex discrimination.  And in turn, 
the denial of protection for non-
gender-conforming men directly 
contributes to the continued subor-
dination of women. 
 Many scholars have argued that the plain language of 
Title VII and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute in 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins provides a sufficient framework 
for protecting men who experience discrimination as a result of 
failing to conform to gender norms.4  Although federal courts 
acknowledge that sex stereotyping is a form of sex discrimina-
tion,5 men who do not satisfy social expectations of masculinity 
have had difficulty succeeding on Title VII claims.  Courts often 
conflate effeminacy with homosexuality,6 viewing “feminine” 
behavior in men as a manifestation of homosexuality (that is, a 
marker for one’s status), rather than recognizing “homosexual” 
as a label that society places on men who engage in non-gender-
conforming conduct (namely, having sex and/or romantic rela-
tionships with other men).  Consequently, when faced with a sex 
discrimination claim asserted by an “effeminate” male plaintiff 
who is either gay or perceived to be so by his coworkers, courts 
typically rule against the plaintiff on the ground that Title VII 
does not protect people who are discriminated against on the 
basis of sexual orientation.     
  Courts have also rejected the majority of sex discrimi-
nation claims brought by transgender persons.7  Changing gen-
ders can be seen as the ultimate form of gender nonconformity.  
When an individual with biologically male genitals takes female 
hormones and/or undergoes gender reassignment surgery, she 
violates the social dictate that she should present herself as a 
person of the gender she was assigned at birth.   I. Bennett Ca-
pers, a professor of law at Hofstra Law School, suggests that gay 
men and lesbians, by their very existence, call into question the 
“complementarity” of the sexes and their respective accepted 
characteristics.8 Similarly, transgender people challenge soci-
ety’s dichotomous concept of gender; they undermine the notion 
that men and women are opposites of one another and that cer-
tain traits are naturally linked to a person’s biological sex.9  Ca-
pers contends that women will continue to face subordination in 
the workplace as long as the concept of a binary gender system 
exists.10  Accordingly, courts would best further Title VII’s pur-
pose by reading the statute as covering a “continuum of gen-
ders,”11 including gay, lesbian, and trans-
gender individuals.   
 This article surveys a number of 
cases and identifies three mechanisms 
employed by courts to deny non-gender-
conforming individuals’ Title VII claims.  
First, the majority of courts fail to distin-
guish between conduct and status.  Indi-
viduals who self-identify or are labeled as 
homosexual or transgender often lose Title 
VII claims because courts conflate this 
unprotected status with the individuals’ 
non-gender-conforming conduct.  A sec-
ond denial mechanism is closely related.  
In many cases involving homosexual or 
transgender plaintiffs, both sexual orienta-
tion/gender identity discrimination and sex discrimination are at 
work.  The existence of the former, which is not prohibited under 
current Title VII jurisprudence, often obscures the existence of 
the latter.  Finally, courts fail to recognize that sexual orientation 
and gender identity/expression discrimination are actually forms 
of sex discrimination.  Homosexual and transgender men and 
women refuse to conform to the gender roles that society as-
signs, on the basis of biological sex.12  This article argues that 
discrimination against non-gender-conforming individuals is sex 
discrimination grounded in sex stereotyping and heterosexist 
expectations.    
 
I. EARLY CASES 
 
 Holloway v. Arthur Andersen and Co.13 was one of the 
first Title VII cases brought by a transgender individual.  The 
plaintiff, Ramona Holloway, was born a biological male.  After 
starting female hormone treatments, Holloway informed her em-
ployer, Arthur Andersen, that she was preparing to undergo sex 
reassignment surgery.14  She began wearing lipstick and nail 
polish to work, as well as a feminine hairstyle, clothing, and jew-
elry.15  A few months later, after she requested that company 
records be changed to reflect her new female name, Holloway 
discrimination against non-gender-
conforming individuals is sex dis-
crimination grounded in sex stereo-
typing and heterosexist expectations.    
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was fired.16   
 Holloway’s supervisor explained in an affidavit that 
Holloway was terminated because her “dress, appearance, and 
manner . . . were such that it was very disruptive and embarrass-
ing to all concerned.”17  This evidence clearly indicated that 
Holloway was fired because her employer did not approve of her 
non-gender-conforming behavior.18  Nevertheless, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that Arthur Andersen had not violated Title 
VII by firing Holloway for initiating the process of sex transi-
tion.19  The judges stated: “Holloway has not claimed to have 
been treated discriminatorily because she is male or female, but 
rather because she is a transsexual who chose to change her sex . 
. .  A transsexual individual’s choice to undergo sex change sur-
gery does not bring that individual, nor transsexuals as a class, 
within the scope of Title VII.”20  The court further reasoned that 
the purpose of Title VII was “to remedy the economic depriva-
tion of women as a class” and that Congress had not “shown any 
intent other than to restrict the term ‘sex’ to its original mean-
ing.”21    
 Circuit Judge Alfred T. Goodwin dissented, interpret-
ing the plain language of the statute to protect Holloway.22  Al-
though Congress “probably never contemplated that Title VII 
would apply to transsexuals,” he argued, Holloway had a legiti-
mate sex discrimination claim.23 Judge Goodwin found that be-
cause Holloway was a female on the day she was fired, she was 
a member of the class that Congress intended Title VII to pro-
tect.24  He argued that the manner in which a plaintiff became a 
member of the protected class, whether via birth as a biological 
female or through gender reassignment surgery, should not mat-
ter for the purpose of a Title VII analysis.25   
 Even though Judge Goodwin would have allowed Hol-
loway to proceed with her Title VII claim, his analysis of the 
case fell short.  Because he stressed the fact that Holloway was a 
woman and therefore a member of “the disadvantaged class” 
that Congress intended Title VII to protect, it is doubtful that he 
would have similarly held in favor of a female-to-male trans-
gender plaintiff.  Moreover, Arthur Andersen did not discrimi-
nate against Holloway because she was a woman.  Holloway’s 
supervisor suggested that Holloway find a new job where her 
transgender identity would be unknown26—indicating that Hol-
loway’s femaleness was problematic only because her employer 
was aware that Holloway had been born a biological male and 
was uncomfortable with her presenting as a woman.   
 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a similar 
Title VII claim brought by a transgender plaintiff in Ulane v. 
Eastern Airlines.27  Karen Ulane, born a biological male, was a 
pilot for Eastern Airlines when she began taking female hor-
mones, developed breasts, and underwent sex reassignment sur-
gery.28  She was fired when she attempted to return to work after 
her surgery.29  After Ulane sued the airline on a Title VII theory, 
the district court reinstated her as a pilot with full seniority, back 
pay, and attorneys’ fees.  The Seventh Circuit overturned that 
ruling, holding that Title VII did not protect transgender people.  
The appellate court reasoned that “[a] prohibition against dis-
crimination based on an individual’s sex is not synonymous with 
a prohibition against discrimination based on an individual’s 
sexual identity disorder or discontent with the sex into which 
they were born.”30  The court maintained that if Congress had 
intended the statute to “apply to anything other than the tradi-
tional concept of sex,” then “surely the legislative history would 
have at least mentioned its intended broad coverage of homo-
sexuals, transvestites, or transsexuals.”31   
 Like Holloway, Ulane suffered discrimination because 
she did not conform to gender stereotypes.  At the time of these 
decisions, courts had not yet recognized that gender stereotyping 
is a form of sex discrimination.32  The courts’ analysis in Hollo-
way and Ulane was similar: The plaintiffs were discriminated 
against because they were transgender; their status, rather than 
their non-gender-conforming conduct, was the basis for the dis-
criminatory treatment.  The next step in the analysis was simple: 
Transgender individuals are not a protected class under Title 
VII, so the plaintiffs’ claims necessarily failed.  Under early 
Title VII jurisprudence, it would always be legal for employers 
to discriminate against transgender employees. 
 
 
II.THE COURTS’ DEVELOPING UNDERSTANDING OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION 
 
 In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court 
broadened its concept of “sex discrimination,” holding that Title 
VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees 
who do not conform to sexual stereotypes.33  The plaintiff, Ann 
Hopkins, was the only woman among eighty-eight candidates up 
for partnership in Price Waterhouse’s Washington, D.C. office 
in 1982.34  Hopkins neither made partner nor was rejected; in-
stead, her candidacy was held over for reconsideration.35  When 
Hopkins was not nominated for partnership the following year, 
she sued the firm under Title VII. 
 The district court found compelling evidence that Price 
Waterhouse’s decision not to offer Hopkins partnership in the 
firm was directly tied to her sex.  The court noted that “none of 
the other partnership candidates at Price Waterhouse that year 
had a comparable record in terms of successfully securing major 
contracts for the [firm].”36  Partners and clients alike praised 
Hopkins’s work, calling her “extremely competent and intelli-
gent,” “strong and forthright, very productive, energetic, and 
creative.”37  Many Price Waterhouse partners, however, “reacted 
negatively to Hopkins’s personality because she was a 
woman.”38  One partner called her “macho,” while another felt 
that she “overcompensated for being a woman,” and a third said 
that she needed to take a class at “charm school.”39  Another 
male partner explained that if Hopkins wanted to improve her 
chances of making partner, she should “walk more femininely, 
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, 
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”40 
 Based on this evidence, the district court concluded that 
“Price Waterhouse had unlawfully discriminated against Hop-
kins on the basis of sex by consciously giving credence and ef-
fect to partners’ comments that resulted from sex stereotyp-
ing.”41  The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s holding.  
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Brennan declared: “We are 
beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by 
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associ-
ated with their group, for in forbidding employers to discrimi-
nate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended 
to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and 
women resulting from sex stereotypes.”42  The Court ruled that 
“gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions”43 and that 
“an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman 
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the 
basis of gender.”44   
 It logically follows from the Price Waterhouse decision 
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that an employer who discriminates against a male employee 
based on his refusal to conform to gender norms has violated 
Title VII.  Nevertheless, for years after Price Waterhouse, fed-
eral courts disagreed about whether the statute prohibits dis-
crimination against Ann Hopkins’s male counterpart: the effemi-
nate man.45  For male plaintiffs, a significant obstacle was the 
tendency of courts to conflate impermissible sex stereotyping 
with sexual orientation discrimination, which courts have repeat-
edly held is not prohibited by Title VII.46  Put differently, when 
considering a “feminine” male employee, courts generally as-
sumed that he faced discrimination because he was gay or per-
ceived to be so, rather than finding that the employer had penal-
ized the plaintiff for not conforming to male stereotypes. 
 For example, in Dillon v. Frank,47 plaintiff Ernest Dil-
lon’s coworkers verbally abused him, calling him a “fag” and 
taunting, “Dillon sucks dicks.”48  Graffiti at the work site de-
clared “Dillon sucks dicks” and “Dillon gives head.”49  After 
three years of harassment, Dillon quit his job and sued his for-
mer employer under Title VII.50  Dillon argued that his was a 
case of sex stereotyping, contending that he was 
harassed because he was not “macho” enough in his 
coworkers’ eyes.51  While the Sixth Circuit ac-
knowledged that the harassment Dillon suffered 
“was clearly sexual in nature,”52 the court held that 
Dillon was subjected to a hostile work environment 
because his coworkers believed he was gay; there-
fore, their actions constituted sexual orientation 
discrimination not prohibited by Title VII.53  The 
court found there was no evidence of sex stereotyp-
ing and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 
Dillon’s lawsuit.54   
Dillon offers an example of how federal 
courts often treat male and female Title VII plain-
tiffs differently. In cases of male-on-female sexual 
harassment, courts tend to take an “I-know-it-when-
I-see it” approach.55 Had Dillon been a woman, he would have 
had a quintessentially actionable sex discrimination case, and the 
court almost certainly would have come out in his favor. But 
when it comes to male plaintiffs harassed by other men, courts 
set the bar much higher.56    
 Why did the Dillon court get it wrong?  First, the possi-
bility that the plaintiff was a victim of sexual orientation dis-
crimination, as suggested by the “fag” epithet, obscured the sex 
discrimination at work in the case.  No evidence existed in the 
record indicating why Dillon’s coworkers believed he was gay; 
presumably there was something about Dillon’s appearance or 
mannerisms, as he argued, that his coworkers believed was not 
“macho” or “masculine” enough.57  The court’s second error 
was its failure to distinguish between non-gender conforming 
conduct and homosexual orientation.  Dillon’s coworkers har-
assed him by referring to sexual acts that Dillon allegedly per-
formed with other men; the discrimination centered on Dillon’s 
perceived conduct.  The court, however, found that Dillon was 
discriminated against because of his perceived homosexual 
status.  This reasoning was problematic because even if Con-
gress amended Title VII to prohibit sexual orientation discrimi-
nation, effeminate men—both gay and straight—might remain 
unprotected.58  That is, while it would be impermissible to fire a 
gay man because of his homosexuality, it might be lawful to fire 
him for being a man who acts too much like a woman.    
 This case helps illustrate that discrimination against 
men who are gay, or perceived to be so, is a form of sex stereo-
typing. Discrimination against homosexual men is grounded in 
heterosexist expectations that “real” men should date and have 
sex with women and not other men.59  Dillon’s coworkers 
mocked him by suggesting that he took the submissive, stereo-
typically “female” role in fellatio.   Mary Ann Case, a professor 
of law at the University of Chicago Law School,  has suggested 
that the harassment of gay men for their receptive role in sexual 
activity is a form of discrimination against the feminine, since it 
is based on the assumption that “real men . . . always tak[e] the 
active/masculine role in bed and elsewhere.”60  Thus, the subor-
dination of both gay men and women is closely linked.   
 Courts may be more inclined to protect female victims 
of sex stereotyping, like Ann Hopkins, than effeminate men be-
cause “masculine” qualities in a woman are typically far less 
socially problematic than “feminine” behavior in a man.61  Fur-
thermore, male employees do not find themselves in a Hopkins-
like bind because characteristics typically labeled as feminine 
are not as valued in the workplace as those characteristics 
deemed masculine.  Consider, for instance, a 2004 incident in 
which California gover-
nor, Arnold Schwar-
zenegger, criticized his 
political opponents by 
calling them “girlie 
men.”62  Schwarzenegger 
did not mean to suggest 
that the lawmakers in 
question were homosex-
ual or effeminate; in-
stead, he was accusing 
them of being weak or 
ineffective.  A spokes-
person for the governor 
even explained that the 
term was “an effective 
way to convey wimpiness.”63  Schwarzenegger’s statement im-
plies that the only people who belong in positions of power are 
“real” men, who are physically strong, macho, and aggressive.64  
The underlying assumption is that women – and men who are 
too much like women – cannot perform effective work.  Case 
has argued that this “disfavoring of characteristics gendered 
feminine may work to the systematic detriment of women and 
thus should be analyzed as a form of sex discrimination.”65  In-
terpreting Title VII to protect men who “act like women” is thus 
absolutely crucial to ending discrimination against women in the 
workplace.  “If women [are] protected for being masculine but 
men [can] be penalized for being effeminate, this. . . would send 
a strong message of subordination to women, because it would 
mean that feminine qualities, which women are disproportion-
ately likely to display, may legitimately be devalued although 
masculine qualities may not.”66 
 In 1997, the Seventh Circuit became one of the first 
courts to recognize that discrimination against a man who does 
not satisfy social expectations of masculinity is sex discrimina-
tion.  The sixteen-year-old male plaintiff in Doe v. City of Belle-
ville67 was dubbed a “fag” and “queer” by his coworkers be-
cause he wore an earring.68  One coworker asked if the plaintiff 
was a boy or a girl, called the plaintiff his “bitch,” and repeat-
edly threatened to take him out into the woods and “get [him] up 
the ass.”69  He also grabbed the plaintiff’s testicles to “find out if 
[he was] a girl or a guy.”70   
 
Discrimination against homosexual 
men is grounded in stereotypes that 
“real” men should date and have sex 
with women and not other men. 
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Fearing that he would be sexually assaulted, Doe quit his job 
and sued his former employer for violating Title VII.   
 
The district court dismissed Doe’s complaint, holding 
that the plaintiff could not show that he was harassed on the ba-
sis of sex because his coworkers were also heterosexual men.71  
However, the Seventh Circuit rejected the notion that a straight 
male plaintiff could not be sexually harassed in violation of Title 
VII by another straight male.  The appellate court pointed out 
that if the plaintiff had been a woman and her breasts had been 
grabbed, most courts would accept this as prima facie evidence 
of sex discrimination.  The motivation for the harassment is be-
yond the point, the court said: “When a male employee’s testi-
cles are grabbed . . . the point is that he experiences that harass-
ment as a man, not just as a worker.”72  It further reasoned: 
 
“[i]f [the plaintiff] were a woman, no 
court would have any difficulty construing 
such abusive conduct as sexual harassment.  
And if the harassment were triggered by that 
woman’s decision to wear overalls and a flan-
nel shirt to work, for example – something her 
harassers might perceive to be masculine just 
as they apparently believed [the plaintiff’s] 
decision to wear an earring to be feminine – 
the court would have all the confirmation that 
it needed that the harassment indeed amounted 
to discrimination on the basis of sex.”73   
 
 The circuit courts remained divided over whether same-
sex harassment was actionable under Title VII until the Supreme 
Court answered in the affirmative in Oncale v. Sundowner Off-
shore Services, Inc.74  The plaintiff, Joseph Oncale, was part of 
an all-male crew on an offshore oil rig.75  He was apparently 
targeted for being slender, longhaired, and wearing an earring.76  
Oncale’s coworkers threatened to rape him, and one held Oncale 
down while another pushed a bar of soap into his anus.77 Oncale 
quit soon after the assault in the shower, scared that he would be 
raped on the job.78 
 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision that Oncale could not bring a Title VII claim 
against his (male) harassers.  Writing for the Court, Justice 
Scalia noted: “As some courts have observed, male-on-male 
sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the princi-
pal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII . 
. . But statutory provisions often go beyond the principal evil to 
cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provi-
sions of our law rather than the principle concerns of our legisla-
tors by which we are governed.”79   
 Justice Scalia emphasized, however, that not all sexual 
harassment violates Title VII.  A plaintiff “must always prove 
that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive 
sexual connotations, but actually constituted discrimination . . . 
because of . . . sex.”80  The Court held that when the harasser 
and the victim are of the opposite sex, there is a reasonable in-
ference that the harasser was acting ‘because of’ sex.81  A simi-
lar inference can be drawn when the harasser is homosexual and 
the victim is of the same sex.82  When such an inference is not 
available, however, a same-sex victim must offer evidence that 
the harasser either treated men and women differently, or was 
motivated by hostility to the presence of a particular sex in the 
workplace.83 
 Although Oncale acknowledged that men could sexu-
ally harass other men, the three evidentiary paths to a same-sex 
Title VII claim that the Court laid out did not represent a signifi-
cant broadening of the Court’s understanding of sex discrimina-
tion.  Justice Scalia failed to cut through the gender dichotomy 
and merely incorporated same-sex relations into the mix.84  No-
tably absent from his analysis was a discussion of male sex 
stereotyping or non-gender-conforming behavior.  In fact, the 
opinion did not mention Oncale’s appearance, which might have 
been insufficiently “masculine” for his coworkers and thus an 
impetus for the discrimination.  Justice Scalia did not even cite 
the Court’s holding in Price Waterhouse, which had been de-
cided only nine years earlier.  The concept of a man who wore 
lipstick or walked and talked in an overly “feminine” way does 
not seem to have crossed the Justices’ minds.   
 
III. THE COURTS’ CONTINUING FAILURE TO PROTECT 
NON-GENDER-CONFORMING MEN 
 
 Even after Price Waterhouse and Oncale, homosexual 
and transgender Title VII plaintiffs continued to face an uphill 
battle.  In theory, under the mixed motives doctrine, if the evi-
dence suggests that an employer’s decision was partly motivated 
by sexual orientation or gender identity discrimination (both of 
which are not prohibited by Title VII), a plaintiff is still pro-
tected by Title VII if he or she was also discriminated against for 
non-gender-conforming behavior.85  Yet in reality, in the major-
ity of cases where both sexual orientation discrimination and sex 
discrimination occur, the existence of the former blinds courts to 
the plaintiff’s cognizable Title VII claim.86   
 For example, in Bibby v. Coca-Cola,87 a coworker re-
peatedly called the male plaintiff a “sissy” and yelled, 
“everybody knows you take it up the ass.”88  The court granted 
summary judgment for the employer on the plaintiff’s Title VII 
action, finding that the plaintiff, who was gay, was harassed 
because of his sexual orientation and not because of sex (that is, 
his failure to adhere to gender norms).89  The court overlooked 
the fact that “sissy” is an insult reserved for boys and men who 
are not perceived as sufficiently masculine.90 A New York dis-
trict court similarly disposed of a gay male plaintiff’s sex dis-
crimination claims in Martin v. Department of Correctional Ser-
vices.91  The plaintiff’s coworkers left sexually explicit photos in 
his work area and drew sexually explicit graffiti on the restroom 
walls, yard booths, and the plaintiff’s time card and interoffice 
mail.92  They also harassed him with derogatory language, like 
“cocksucker” and “fucking faggot.”93  But because the court 
found no evidence that Martin acted in an effeminate manner,94 
it granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.95  It 
ruled that in order to ensure that plaintiffs do not bootstrap sex-
ual orientation claims under Title VII, “a plaintiff must demon-
strate that he does not, or at the very least is not perceived to, act 
masculine”96 in order to make out an actionable case of sex dis-
crimination.  
While not all gay men are effeminate, and not all 
straight men are “macho,” Martin illuminates the troubling ne-
cessity for a homosexual plaintiff to emphasize his “femininity” 
in his complaint in order to convince the court that sex discrimi-
nation, not sexual orientation discrimination, was the root of his 
harassment.  As one commentator has put it: “[E]ntitlement to 
Title VII protection ultimately depends on spurious factors such 
as whether the particular words and actions used by harassers 
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are sufficiently ‘sexual,’ whether the victim is an ‘effeminate’ or 
‘masculine’ homosexual, and whether the victim pleads his 
claim in language sanctioned by the courts that downplays or 
does not mention if the plaintiff is gay.”97  Under this jurispru-
dence, Title VII will protect the stereotypically effeminate gay 
man, but not the gay man who “acts straight,” or passes as 
stereotypically masculine.  This also presents a problem for the 
male plaintiff who is deemed to be too feminine by his cowork-
ers, but not quite feminine enough for the court to find that he 
was a victim of sex stereotyping.   
  Heterosexual men who are perceived as gay have also 
had difficulty establishing Title VII claims.  For example, in 
Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc.,98 coworkers called 
Michael Hamm, a straight male, a “faggot” and a “Girl Scout.”99  
There were rumors that Hamm had a relationship with another 
male employee, and coworkers often asked him whether he had 
a girlfriend and why he was not married.100  After Hamm com-
plained of sexual harassment, he was fired.  Hamm then sued his 
former employer under Title VII.  Concluding that the term 
“Girl Scout” was unrelated to gender, the court found that 
Hamm was not a victim of sex discrimination; rather, he was 
harassed because of his perceived homosexuality.   
 In this case, the gender nonconformity suggested by the 
term “Girl Scout” was hidden behind the “faggot” epithet.  
Hamm suggested to the court that “when a heterosexual male is 
harassed and the basis offered for the harassment is ‘perceived 
homosexuality,’ then it is likely and reasonable to infer that gen-
der stereotyping is present and is the real basis for the harass-
ment.”101  The court rejected this argument, insisting that “courts 
have never focused on the sexuality of the parties involved when 
determining whether sexual harassment occurred.”  Hamm of-
fers another example of how courts fail to distinguish conduct 
and status.  Ironically, the court defined Hamm’s heterosexual 
status as irrelevant and at the same time made his status as a 
perceived homosexual determinative.   
 Hamm also illustrates that discrimination based on sex-
ual orientation, or perceived homosexuality, is in itself a form of 
sex discrimination.  Social norms prescribe that men should be 
sexually attracted only to women, should date only women, and 
ultimately should marry women.  “It is essential to the mainte-
nance of heterosexism that these two genders are interpreted as . 
. . being ‘naturally’ attracted to one another.”102  Deviation from 
this pattern of normative behavior arouses suspicion.  Hamm’s 
coworkers discriminated against Hamm because he was unmar-
ried and may not have had a girlfriend.    This case is an exam-
ple of how courts have declined “to recognize that sanctions 
levied on individuals for behaving or presenting themselves in a 
fashion commonly associated with homosexual orientation or 
transgender status are themselves a function of community dis-
approval of the plaintiff’s refusal or failure to adhere to gen-
dered notions about appearance, attire, as well as sexual and 
nonsexual behavior.”103   
 In Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc.,104 the court held 
that an employer had not engaged in sex discrimination when it 
fired the male plaintiff for presenting himself as a woman out-
side of work.  In his off time, Peter Oiler, a truck driver for 
Winn-Dixie, occasionally adopted a female name, Donna, and 
wore makeup, skirts, nail polish, a bra, and silicone prostheses to 
enlarge his breasts.105  After the president of Winn-Dixie learned 
that Oiler sometimes appeared in public as Donna, Oiler was 
fired.106  At trial, Oiler’s supervisor testified that crossdressing 
was “unacceptable” in the area where Oiler worked, indicating 
there was “a large customer base there that have various beliefs, 
be it religion or a morality or family values or people that just 
don’t want to associate with that type of behavior . . .”107 
 Winn-Dixie contended that Oiler had not been termi-
nated for refusing to adhere to masculine stereotypes, but instead 
because he was a man who publicly pretended to be a woman.108  
The district court accepted this distinction and agreed that Oiler 
was not a victim of sex discrimination.  The court distinguished 
the case from Price Waterhouse, maintaining that “the plaintiff 
[in Price Waterhouse] may not have behaved as the partners 
thought a woman should behave, but she never pretended to be a 
man [n]or adopted a masculine persona.”109   
 Oiler is yet another example of the courts’ insistence on 
maintaining a gender dichotomy.  In Oiler’s own words: “[T]oo 
many people don't see the middle ground between black and 
white. And that's where people in my situation really are. People 
hadn't even heard the word transgender. There are a whole 
bunch of people in the middle.”110  So long as courts refuse to 
recognize that gender identity discrimination and sex discrimina-
tion are parts of the same whole, individuals like Oiler, who 
identify as male, but also want to express female parts of their 
identity, will remain vulnerable to discrimination in the work-
place. 
 
IV. RECENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE 
 
 There is some reason for optimism, however.  Several 
non-gender-conforming plaintiffs have recently succeeded on 
sex discrimination claims.  In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant En-
terprises, Inc., plaintiff Antonio Sanchez alleged that he was 
verbally harassed for not adhering to social demands of mascu-
linity.111  Coworkers used feminine pronouns to refer to Sanchez 
and mocked him for walking and carrying his serving tray “like 
a woman.”112  The Ninth Circuit held that the evidence that other 
employees referred to Sanchez using female gender pronouns 
and taunted him for behaving like a woman amounted to action-
able gender stereotyping.    
  In Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., Medina Rene, an 
openly gay man, worked as part of an all-male butler staff.113  
Rene was constantly harassed by his coworkers, who called him 
“sweetheart,” “muñeca,” and “fucking female whore.”114  They 
told crude jokes, gave him sexually oriented ‘gifts,’ and forced 
him to look at pornography.115  Rene was also repeatedly sexu-
ally assaulted; his coworkers touched him “like they would to a 
woman,” grabbed his crotch, and poked their fingers in his 
anus.116 
 The district court dismissed Rene’s Title VII suit, find-
ing that Rene was targeted because he was gay,117 but the Ninth 
Circuit reversed.  The appellate court found that since the as-
saults targeted sexual body parts, Rene had been harassed 
“because . . . of sex,”118 and whatever else may have motivated 
the attacks was of no legal consequence.  The court cited On-
cale, noting that the plaintiff “did not need to show that he was 
treated worse than members of the opposite sex.  It was enough 
to show that he suffered discrimination in comparison to other 
men.”119  However, the court’s decision in favor of Rene relied 
heavily on the severity of the offensive sexual contact; had Rene 
not been sexually assaulted, or had the touching been less egre-
gious, the court may not have ruled in his favor.120   
Although the majority ignored the fact that Rene’s co-
workers called Rene “sweetheart,” “muñeca,” and “fucking fe-
male whore,” and missed the logical conclusion that Rene was 
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targeted because his coworkers did not find him to be masculine 
enough, three concurring judges found that this was a case of 
actionable gender stereotyping.121  Circuit Judge Harry Preger-
son pointed to the evidence that Rene’s coworkers touched him 
and spoke to him “like a woman.”122  “There would be no reason 
for Rene’s coworkers to whistle at Rene ‘like a woman,’ unless 
they perceived him to be not enough like a man and too much 
like a woman,” Pregerson wrote.123  “This is gender stereotyp-
ing, and that is what Rene meant when he said he was discrimi-
nated against because he was openly gay.”124  Thus, some judges 
are beginning to understand that men who are harassed for being 
gay are targeted because they do not conform to their coworkers' 
expectations of what a ‘real man’ is like, and that this is sex dis-
crimination. 
 In two recent cases, the Sixth Circuit concluded that 
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination against individu-
als who do not present themselves as members of the gender 
they were assigned on the basis of biological sex.  In Smith v. 
City of Salem,125 plaintiff Jimmie Smith was a lieutenant in the 
City Fire Department.  When Smith started “expressing a more 
feminine appearance” at work, his coworkers commented on 
Smith’s appearance and told him that he was not acting 
“masculine enough.”126  After Smith informed his supervisor 
that he intended to transition into living as a woman, the depart-
ment planned to fire Smith.127 
 The district court dismissed Smith’s sex discrimination 
claim, ruling that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination 
against transgender people.128  The Sixth Circuit reversed, rea-
soning that: 
 
“[a]fter Price Waterhouse, an employer who 
discriminates against women because, for in-
stance, they do not wear dresses or makeup is 
engaging in sex discrimination because the 
discrimination would not occur but for the 
victim’s sex.  It follows that employers who 
discriminate against men because they do 
wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act 
femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimi-
nation, because the discrimination 
would not occur but for the victim’s 
sex.”129 
 
Smith alleged that his conduct and manner-
isms did not conform to his employers’ and 
coworkers’ ideas of how a man should look 
and behave.130  The court agreed that if this 
were the basis for his termination, Smith had 
an actionable sex discrimination claim: 
“Discrimination against a plaintiff who is a 
transsexual – and therefore fails to act and/or 
identify with his or her gender – is no differ-
ent from the discrimination directed against 
Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse, who, in 
sex-stereotypical terms, did not act like a 
woman.  Sex stereotyping based on a person’s non-gender con-
forming behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective 
of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is 
not fatal to a sex discrimination claim . . . ”131 
 In Barnes v. City of Cincinnati,132 the plaintiff, Philecea 
Barnes, had been an officer in the Cincinnati Police Department 
for seventeen years.  Barnes presented himself as a man while 
on-duty, and as a woman while off-duty.  He had a French mani-
cure, arched eyebrows, and occasionally came to work wearing 
makeup.133  After Barnes was promoted to sergeant,134 he was 
the only sergeant subjected to extra supervision during the pro-
bationary period.135  Rumors circulated through the police de-
partment that Barnes was either homosexual or bisexual.136  One 
of Barnes’ supervisors told him that he did not appear to be 
“masculine” and needed to stop wearing makeup.137  Another 
supervisor told Barnes that he was going to fail probation be-
cause he was not “acting masculine enough.”138  Although his 
scores were above the minimum for passing, and even higher 
than at least one other sergeant who passed the probationary 
period, Barnes failed.139  According to several other officers, 
Barnes lacked “command presence” and did not have the respect 
of his subordinates.140  Barnes was the only person to fail proba-
tion between 1993 and 2000.141 
 At trial, Barnes successfully claimed that his demotion 
from sergeant violated Title VII, and the jury found in his fa-
vor.142  Barnes argued that he was discriminated against because 
he failed to conform to sex stereotypes.143  The Sixth Circuit 
upheld the judgment on appeal, holding that Barnes had pro-
duced evidence sufficient to support his claim of sex discrimina-
tion.  The court relied on the comments made by his superior 
officers and noted that Barnes was singled out for intense scru-
tiny.  It also found that Barnes’s “ambiguous sexuality” and his 
practice of dressing as a woman outside of work were well-
known within the CPD.144   
 One of the most recent cases involving a transgender 
plaintiff was Schroer v. Billington.145  Diane Schroer was born a 
biological male.  Before she legally changed her name or began 
presenting herself as a woman, she applied for job at the Library 
of Congress.  She interviewed as “David,” her legal name at the 
time, and wore traditional male clothing.  After she was hired, 
Schroer told the interviewer that she was transgender, would be 
transitioning from male to female, and would begin work as 
Diane.  The next day, Schroer was informed that she was “not a 
good fit,” and the job offer was retracted.  Schroer then brought 
a Title VII suit against the Library of Congress.146 
 The court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Schroer, finding that she was a 
victim of sex discrimination.  
District Judge James Robertson 
observed that the Library may 
have perceived Schroer as “an 
insufficiently masculine man, 
an insufficiently feminine 
woman, or an inherently non-
gender-conforming individual” 
and that each of the three 
amounted to impermissible sex 
stereotyping.147  The court also 
agreed with Schroer’s argument 
that “because gender identity is 
a component of sex, discrimina-
tion on the basis of gender iden-
tity is sex discrimination.”148  It determined that the Library had 
violated Title VII’s plain language prohibiting discrimination 
“because of  . . . sex” when it revoked its offer upon learning 
that Schroer, a biological male, intended to become “legally, 
culturally, and physically, a woman named Diane.”149  The court 
noted, critically, that other courts “have allowed their focus on 
the label ‘transsexual’ to blind them to the statutory language 
Sex stereotyping based on a person’s 
non-gender conforming behavior is 
impermissible discrimination, irre-
spective of the cause of that behav-
ior; a label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is 
not fatal to a sex discrimination 
claim . . . ” 
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itself.”150   
 The Schroer decision indicates that federal courts are 
beginning to acknowledge that discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, gender identity, and gender expression are all forms 
of sex discrimination.  Individuals like Peter Oiler, Diane 
Schroer, and Medina Rene experienced discrimination because 
they did not conform to their employers’ expectations of mascu-
linity.  Demanding that a person behave or present himself or 
herself in a certain way at work because of the gender that soci-
ety assigned to that person based on his or her genitals is sex 
discrimination.  The Supreme Court has held already that sex 
stereotyping violates Title VII; breaking down the socially-
constructed gender dichotomy may go past the Court’s analysis 
in Price Waterhouse, but it is the logical next step.  Moreover, 
analyzing Title VII claims would be far easier for courts if they 
stopped trying to maintain a gender divide that has become in-
creasingly non-credible.151   
 
V. TITLE VII AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
 
 The remaining question is whether a broadened concep-
tion of sex discrimination conflicts with congressional intent.  
Many courts have refused to extend Title VII’s protections to 
homosexual or transsexual plaintiffs on the grounds that doing 
so would contravene the purpose of Title VII.  For instance, in 
Ulane, the Seventh Circuit declared, “[t]he total lack of legisla-
tive history supporting the sex amendment coupled with the cir-
cumstances of the amendment’s adoption clearly indicates that 
Congress never considered nor intended this 1964 legislation to 
apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex.  Had 
Congress intended more, surely the legislative history would 
have at least mentioned its intended broad coverage of homo-
sexuals, transvestites, or transsexuals.”152   
 Courts and commentators who express this view ignore 
the fact that the Supreme Court left the legislative history of 
Title VII behind with Price Waterhouse.  And in Oncale, where 
the Court acknowledged that same-sex harassment is actionable 
under Title VII, Justice Scalia – a strict textualist153 and one of 
the most conservative Justices – wrote: “As some courts have 
observed, male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was 
assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with 
when it enacted Title VII.  But statutory provisions often go be-
yond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, 
and it is ultimately the provisions of our law rather than the prin-
cipal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”154  
In light of courts’ gradually broadening interpretation of Title 
VII, their refusal to extend the statute’s protections to trans-
gender and homosexual persons based on legislative history 
seems disingenuous. The court in Schroer v. Billington 
agreed, stating, “[t]he decisions holding that Title VII only pro-
hibits discrimination against men because they are men, and 
discrimination against women because they are women, repre-
sent an elevation of ‘judge-supported legislative intent over clear 
statutory text.’”155  
Some commentators who oppose an expanded reading 
of Title VII have pointed out that Congress has rejected propos-
als to amend Title VII to prohibit sexual orientation and gender 
identity discrimination.156  They argue that this shows that Con-
gress did not intend the statute to protect homosexual and trans-
gender people.  However, the Schroer Court expressly rejected 
such an argument, stating that the Supreme Court has cautioned 
against using legislative history in this way:  
 
Subsequent legislative history is a 
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an 
earlier Congress.  It is a particularly dangerous 
ground on which to rest an interpretation of a 
prior statute when it concerns, as it does here, 
a proposal that does not become law.  
 Congressional inaction lacks persuasive sig-
nificance because several equally tenable in-
ferences may be drawn from such inaction, 
including the inference that the existing legis-
lation already incorporated the offered 
change.157 
 
The Schroer Court suggested that Congress may have rejected 
the passage of bills that would amend Title VII to expressly pro-
hibit gender identity discrimination because the statute already 
forbids it.  Thus, the legislative “non-history” of Title VII may 
demonstrate that “some Members of Congress believe that the 
Ulane court and others have interpreted ‘sex’ in an unduly nar-
row manner . . . and that the statute requires, not amendment, but 
only correct interpretation.”158 Joel Friedman, a professor of law 
at Tulane Law School, has argued that interpreting discrimina-
tion on the basis of “sex” to encompass sexual orientation and 
gender identity discrimination would not circumvent congres-
sional intent.159  He points out that Congress often paints “in 
broad remedial strokes,” leaving the work of interpretation up to 
the courts.160   
 Moreover, the courts’ narrow interpretation of Title VII 
frustrates the statute’s broad remedial purpose.161  By refusing to 
protect gay men, lesbians, bisexual, and transgender people who 
face discrimination because they do not conform to a binary 
gender system, “courts perpetuate the very subordination that 
Title VII was designed to eliminate.”162  Courts’ insistence on 
maintaining a strict gender dichotomy reinforces the notion that 
women and men “are” and “should be” a certain way.  If em-
ployers are allowed to demand that men not act “like women,” 
this sends a message to all people that being “feminine” is not a 
very good way to be – reinforcing patriarchy in the workplace 
and society as a whole.  This result is antithetical to the statute’s 




 “[T]he world will not be safe for women in frilly pink 
dresses . . . unless and until it is made safe for men in dresses as 
well.”164  The refusal of courts to recognize gender nonconform-
ity discrimination as sex discrimination legitimizes social de-
valuation of the feminine.  Instead of breaking down barriers in 
the workplace, as Title VII was intended to do, courts are actu-
ally reinforcing stereotypes about men and women when they 
allow employers to discriminate against non-gender-conforming 
men.  In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court declared that 
“gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions.”165  To 
give proper effect to Title VII, courts must recognize sexual 
orientation, gender identity, and gender expression discrimina-
tion as sex discrimination and interpret the statute so as to pro-
tect individuals no matter where they fall along the gender con-
tinuum.   
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